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Executive Summary 
This report contains an analysis of a new economic development incentive 
that has been proposed as an addition to the existing BEST program.   
 
Proposed Incentive 
The proposed incentive program is an investment incentive of up to 100 
percent of the value of the qualified investment.  The main features of the proposed 
incentive are:  
• Firms in tiers 1, 2, and 3 would be allowed to take up to a 100 percent 
exemption of Georgia Corporate Income Tax, while firms in Tier 4 
counties up to a 50 percent exemption.  
 
• Firms would also be allowed to retain a percentage of the increase in 
employee personal income tax withholding. The percentage of the 
withholding that a firm could retain would vary by tier.  Firms in Tier 1 
would retain 100 percent of the income tax withheld, firms in Tier 2 
would retain 80 percent, firms in Tier 3 would retain 60 percent, and 
firms in Tier 4 would retain 40 percent. 
 
• The total value of these two benefits that a firm could take over the 
allowable period would be limited to the total value of the qualified 
investment.  
 
• Eligibility for the proposed program would require both a minimum 
increase in jobs (equal to the current requirement for the job tax credit), 
and a minimum capital investment.  The minimum investment would 
vary by tier: $50,000 would be required in Tier 1; $100,000 would be 
required in Tier 2; $150,000 would be required in Tier 3; $250,000 would 
be required in Tier 4.  
 
• The process would require a formal application to be filed with the State 
of Georgia and the company would be required to receive initial approval 
prior to earning tax benefits (whether corporate & personal).  
 
• Using the application as a guide, the state would establish the maximum 
amount of tax benefits available for each project.  In other words, 
meeting the minimum eligibility requirements would not be sufficient to 
receive the incentives. 
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• Firms would not be eligible for the existing Job Tax Credit or either of the 
two investment tax credits. 
 
Compared to the existing Job Tax Credit and the two investment tax credit 
programs, the proposed program provides a much larger incentive.  Under the new 
program the total incentive for a firm will be two to four times the total incentive 
under the existing programs.  
 
Kentucky’s Incentive Programs 
Kentucky has three economic development incentive programs that, taken 
together, are similar to the proposed incentive program.  The Kentucky Rural 
Economic Development Act (KREDA) program currently applies to 63 depressed 
counties, while the Kentucky Industrial Development Act (KIDA) program applies to 
the remaining 57 counties.  Other than the level of the allowable credit, the two 
programs are similarly structured.  Only firms in the manufacturing sector are eligible 
for these two programs.  A third program, the Kentucky Job Development Act 
(KJDA) program, applies to non-manufacturing, non-retail businesses for which 75 
percent of sales are from out-of-state purchasers.   
These programs provide two types of incentives.  First, firms can receive up 
to a 100 percent exemption of state income tax for investment in plant and 
equipment.  The exemption is limited by the size and nature of the financing of the 
investment.  Second, the firm may collect a “job development assessment fee” equal 
to a percentage of the gross wages of each new employee; the job assessment fee 
equals 3 percent for the KIDA program, 4 percent for the KREDA program, and up to 
5 percent for the KJDA program.   
For the KIDA program, firms must choose one or the other of the two 
incentives.  For the other two programs, firms receive both incentives.  The allowable 
benefits of the program are negotiated with the state, with actual benefits dependent 
on the actual investment and job creation.   
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Table 1 presents the value of incentives actually taken by year for the three 
Kentucky programs. For 1998, the total value of the incentives taken was $46.4 
million for the three programs for both types of incentives. 
 
Economic Effects of Kentucky’s Incentive Programs 
Since we were unable to identify any existing studies that analyze the 
economic effects of the Kentucky incentive programs, we conducted an analysis that 
focused on changes in per capita income, earnings, and employment.  Information 
gleaned from comparisons of employment growth rates suggests conclusions similar 
to those from comparisons of per capita income and earnings.   
In terms of overall employment growth, Kentucky appears to have performed 
at about the level of the Southeast as a whole, and appears to have under-performed 
relative to the nation as a whole, in the immediate five-year period following the 
initiation of the state’s incentive programs in 1992.  However, Kentucky significantly 
out-performed the Southeast and the nation in manufacturing employment growth 
during the same period, the sector in which the incentives were primarily targeted.  
Of course, these results are tempered by the fact that the state significantly out-
performed the Southeast and the U.S. in manufacturing employment growth during 
the previous five-year period as well (1987 – 1992).  Thus, there is little evidence that 
the growth in employment in Kentucky increased after 1992 relative to the growth 
that the nation and the Southeast was experiencing. 
 
Cost of Proposed Incentive Program 
If all eligible firms are allowed to take the available incentive, we estimate 
that the annual cost of the withholding component of the incentive ITWA for 
manufacturing firms is $82.3 million. If non-manufacturing, non-retail firms are also 
eligible for the proposed incentive program, we estimate an additional cost of the 
proposed program of $294.8 million.   
In addition to the ITWA, firms can use their corporate tax liability to take the 
proposed investment incentive.  We estimate that the annual corporate tax liability 
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that manufacturing firms could take between $7.3 million to $9.2 million per year in 
tax credits.  For non-manufacturing, non-retail firms, we estimate that the revenue 
loss would be $22.0 million to $27.9 million.   
Combining the two components, i.e., the ITWA and the investment tax credit, 
the estimated total annual revenue loss to the State, assuming that the State allows all 
eligible firms to take as much incentive as feasible, is between $89.6 million and 
$91.5 million for manufacturing firms, and between $316.8 million and $322.7 
million for non-manufacturing, non-retail firms. 
The proposal calls for the State to determine which firms get the incentive 
and the amount.  It is not possible to predict how restrictive the State would be in 
allowing firms to take the incentives.  However, Kentucky’s program is discretionary, 
and so we can estimate the revenue cost to Georgia if Georgia was as restrictive as 
Kentucky has been.  The KREDA program is closest to the proposed program, but 
there are some differences with the proposed program.  Adjusting for these 
differences, we obtain an estimate of the annual revenue loss to the State of $84.2 
million for manufacturing firms.  The actual revenue loss to the State will depend 
upon how restrictive the State is in granting incentives to eligible firms and whether 
non-manufacturing, non-retail firms are eligible.  
 
Fiscal Impact 
To estimate the likely fiscal impact on the State, we consider two scenarios 
regarding who gets new jobs and the two scenarios regarding the industry in which 
the new job is located yield four alternatives sets of assumptions.  Table 2 shows for 
each assumption the net fiscal benefit (additional revenue less additional 
expenditures) to the State per year per job created by the incentive, gross of the value 
of the incentive.  As can be seen, under the assumption that all jobs go to new 
residents and using the weighted average of the fiscal effect across all eligible 
industries the net fiscal benefit to the State, gross of the incentive, is $794 per year.  If 
we use the weighted average of the fiscal effect across just manufacturing industries, 
the  net  fiscal effect, gross of the incentive, falls to $359.   The net fiscal effect, gross  
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TABLE 2.  FISCAL BENEFIT TO THE STATE FROM ONE NEW JOB 
Assumption 
Net Fiscal Benefit to 
State Government 
Per Year Per Job 
Job growth equal to actual, new jobs go to 
non-resident $794 
Job growth equal to actual in manufacturing, 
new jobs go to non-resident $359 
Job growth equal to actual, half of new jobs 
go to non-resident $6,045 
Job growth equal to actual in manufacturing, 
half new jobs go to non-resident $5,936 
 
of the incentive, increases substantially under the assumption that half of the jobs go 
to current residents. 
The fiscal benefit net of the incentive depends upon how well the State does 
in restricting incentives to firms that would not otherwise have located in Georgia.  If 
the State does a perfect job, then each job can be credited to the incentive.  In that 
case the net fiscal benefit described in Table 2 can be associated with each job that 
receives an incentive.  But if the State does an extremely bad job of picking firm to 
which it provides an incentive, i.e., incentives go to firms that would have located in 
Georgia without the incentive, then little of the benefits described in Table 2 can be 
credited to the incentives.   
A previous report provided estimates of the number of job tax credits that 
resulted in new jobs.∗  That estimate was that 30 percent of the credits were for new 
jobs.  Thus, if the State were to grant an incentive to every firm that applied, we 
would expect that it would be a “success” 30 percent of the time, where success 
means giving an incentive to a firm that would not have otherwise located in Georgia. 
It is an open question as to whether the State could be more successful than that, and 
it is possible that it could do worse.   
We estimate that the investment per worker will be about $70,000 per worker.  
But the typical firm will not be able to take full advantage of the incentive because of 
                                                 
∗ Dagney Faulk, et al., An Analysis of Georgia’s Economic Development Tax Credit Incentives, 
Report No. 42, January 2000. Atlanta: Fiscal Research Program, Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies, Georgia State University. 
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limited corporate income tax liability and income tax withholding.  We assume that 
25 percent of the maximum possible incentive will be taken by the firm.  Thus, the 
typical incentive would be about $1750 per worker.  This is higher than the first two 
entries in Table 2, meaning the State would suffer a fiscal loss.  However, if 50 
percent of the new jobs are taken by current Georgia residents, and if one out of three 
firms that the State gave incentive to would not have located in Georgia in the 
absence of the incentive, then the incentive would yield a positive fiscal benefit, net 
of the incentive, to the State. 
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Introduction 
The Georgia Department of Industry, Trade and Tourism requested an 
analysis of a new economic development incentive that has been proposed as an 
addition to the existing BEST program. This report contains an analysis of that 
proposed incentive.  Section 1 describes the proposed incentive program.  Section 2 
describes the Kentucky incentive programs on which the proposed program is based.  
Section 3 contains an analysis Kentucky’s experience with its incentive programs.  
Section 4 provides an analysis of the proposed incentive program for Georgia.  
Finally, Section 5 provides an update of the incentives offered by other southeastern 
states.   
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I.  The Description of the Proposed Incentive Program 
 
The proposed incentive program is an investment incentive of up to 100 
percent of the value of the qualified investment.  The two main features of the 
proposed incentive concern how the firm would take advantage of the incentive: 
• Firms in Tiers 1, 2, and 3 would be allowed to take up to a 100 percent 
exemption of Georgia Corporate Income Tax, while firms in Tier 4 counties 
up to a 50 percent exemption.  
 
• Firms would also be allowed to retain a percentage of the increase in 
employee personal income tax withholding. The percentage of the 
withholding that a firm could retain would vary by tier.  Firms in Tier 1 
would retain 100 percent of the income tax withheld, firms in Tier 2 would 
retain 80 percent, firms in Tier 3 would retain 60 percent, and firms in Tier 4 
would retain 40 percent. 
 
The total value of these two benefits that a firm could take over the allowable period 
would be limited to the total value of the qualified investment.  We assume that if a 
firm took the proposed incentive, the firm would not be eligible for the existing Job 
Tax Credit or either of the two investment tax credits. 
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the current BEST job tax credit 
program.  For the current Investment Tax Credit, firms must investment a minimum 
of $50,000 and in turn receive a corporate income tax credit of 5 percent of the 
investment for Tier 1 firms, 3 percent for Tier 2 firms, and 1 percent for Tier 3 and 
Tier 4 firms.  The credit can be taken over 10 years.  For the Optional Investment 
Tax Credit, the minimum investments are higher, $5 million in Tier 1, $10 million 
in Tier 2, and $20 million in Tiers 3 and 4.  The corporate income tax credit is 
also higher: 10 percent for Tier 1 firms, 8 percent for Tier 2 firms, and 6 percent 
for Tier 3 and Tier 4 firms.  The credit can be taken over 10 years.  The credit 
cannot exceed 90 percent of the increase in tax liability over the base year. 
Table 2 shows how the proposed incentive differs from the BEST tax credit 
programs.  Values are highlighted in bold where there are changes or additions.   
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TABLE 1.  CURRENT BEST JOB TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 
  Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 
Number of Countiesa  71 35 35 18 
Tax credit per new full-
time job per year for  
five years (as long as 
maintained)  
$3,500 $2,500 $1,250 $750 
Job creation 
requirements  5 10 15 25 
New job average wage 
requirements  
 
 
 
Above the average 
wage of the county 
that has the lowest 
average wage of any 
county in the state. 
Above the average 
wage of the county 
that has the lowest 
average wage of any 
county in the state. 
Above the average 
wage of the county 
that has the lowest 
average wage of any 
county in the state. 
Above the average 
wage of the county 
that has the lowest 
average wage of any 
county in the state. 
Health insurance to be 
made available if 
available to current 
employees  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Limits on use of job tax 
credit against income tax 
liability (i.e. Corporate 
Income Tax) 
100% 100% 50% 50% 
Use of income tax 
withholdingb Yes No No No 
Percentage of payroll 
withholding that can be 
retained by company  
(i.e. Personal Income 
Tax) 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
Joint Development 
Authority bonus  $500 $500 $500 $500 
Port Authority bonus  $1,250 $1,250 $1,250 $1,250 
Notes: 
a Counties are ranked each year, prior to December 31, using the following criteria: A) highest unemployment 
rate for the most recent 36 month period; B) lowest per capita income for the most recent 36 month period; and 
C) highest percentage of residents whose incomes are below the poverty level. Tier 1 counties are those most 
economically distressed.  
b This provision, available in Tier 1 counties, allows companies that are unable to use all their credits against 
income tax liability to also use their credits against payroll taxes withheld from their employees.   
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TABLE 2.  PROPOSED INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
(Bold text reflects changes from the existing programs) 
  Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 
Number of Countiesa  71 35 35 18 
Tax credit per new 
full-time job per year 
for five years (as long 
as maintained)  
$0 $0 $0 $0 
Job creation 
requirements  5 10 15 25 
New job average wage 
requirements  
Above the average 
wage of the county 
that has the lowest 
average wage of any 
county in the state. 
Above the average 
wage of the county 
that has the lowest 
average wage of any 
county in the state. 
Above the average 
wage of the county 
that has the lowest 
average wage of any 
county in the state. 
Above the average 
wage of the county 
that has the lowest 
average wage of any 
county in the state. 
Health insurance to be 
made available if 
available to current 
employees  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Required Minimum 
Capital Investment  $50,000 $100,000 $150,000 $250,000 
Percentage of income 
tax liability eligible for 
credit for investment 
tax credit (i.e. 
Corporate Income Tax) 
100% 100% 100% 50% 
Can income tax with-
holding be usedb  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Percentage of increase 
in Payroll Withholding 
to be Retained by 
Company  
(i.e. Personal Income 
Tax) 
100% 80% 60% 40% 
Joint Development 
Authority bonus  $0 $0 $0 $0 
Port Authority bonus  $0 $0 $0 $0 
Notes: 
a Counties are ranked each year, prior to December 31, using the following criteria: A) highest unemployment 
rate for the most recent 36 month period; B) lowest per capita income for the most recent 36 month period; and 
C) highest percentage of residents whose incomes are below the poverty level. Tier 1 counties are most 
economically distressed. 
b This provision, available in all counties, will allow companies that are unable to use all of their job tax credits 
against their corporate income tax liability to also use their credits against payroll taxes withheld from their 
employees.  
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Other features of the proposed incentive relative to the current provisions in BEST 
are: 
• Eligibility for the proposed program would require both a minimum increase 
in jobs (equal to the current requirement for the job tax credit), and a 
minimum capital investment.  The minimum investment would vary by tier: 
$50,000 would be required in Tier 1; $100,000 would be required in Tier 2; 
$150,000 would be required in Tier 3; $250,000 would be required in Tier 4.  
 
• The incentive can be taken over a 10-year period, which is the same as the 
current Investment Tax Credit.  The current Job Tax Credit can be taken for 
each of five years and has a 5-year carry-forward provision. 
 
• For purposes of our analysis and to be consistent with the Kentucky program, 
eligible projects would include new and expanding manufacturing facilities 
and non-manufacturing, non-retail firms that are new or expanding.  The 
latter is more inclusive than the eligible industries as defined in current BEST 
legislation. 
 
• At least 75 percent of the sales of non-manufacturing, non-retail firms must 
be to out-of-state purchasers. 
 
• The current bonuses associated with Joint Development Authorities and Port 
Authorities, would not be applicable. 
 
• The process would require a formal application to be filed with the State of 
Georgia and the company would be required to receive initial approval prior 
to earning tax benefits (whether corporate & personal).  
 
• The application would require a $500 application fee, which would be used to 
offset a portion of the administrative costs of the incentive program. 
 
• Further, the company would be required to pay to the State of Georgia an 
administrative fee of 0.25 percent of the maximum amount of eligible 
benefits, up to a maximum fee of $25,000.  This fee would also be used to 
offset the administrative costs of the incentive process. 
 
• The application would require a letter of support from the local development 
authority. 
 
• Using the application as a guide, the state would establish the maximum 
amount of tax benefits available for each project.  In other words, meeting the 
minimum eligibility requirements would not be sufficient to receive the 
incentives. 
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II.  The Kentucky Incentive Programs 
 
 Kentucky has three economic development incentive programs that, taken 
together, are similar to the proposed incentive program.  The Kentucky Rural 
Economic Development Act (KREDA) program currently applies to 63 depressed 
counties, while the Kentucky Industrial Development Act (KIDA) program applies to 
the remaining 57 counties.  Other than the level of the allowable credit, the two 
programs are similarly structured.  Only firms in the manufacturing sector are eligible 
for these two programs.  A third program, the Kentucky Job Development Act 
(KJDA) program, applies to non-manufacturing, non-retail businesses for which 75 
percent of sales are from out-of-state purchasers.   
These programs provide two types of incentives.  First, firms can receive up 
to a 100 percent exemption of state income tax for investment in plant and 
equipment.  The exemption is limited by the size and nature of the financing of the 
investment.  Second, the firm may collect a “job development assessment fee” equal 
to a percentage of the gross wages of each new employee; the job assessment fee 
equals 3 percent for the KIDA program, 4 percent for the KREDA program, and up to 
5 percent for the KJDA program.   
For the KIDA program, firms must choose one or the other of the two 
incentives.  For the other two programs, firms receive both incentives.  The allowable 
benefits of the program are negotiated with the state, with actual benefits dependent 
on the actual investment and job creation.  The three programs are described below; 
more details are presented in the Appendix. (The descriptions are based on 
information from the State of Kentucky web site.) 
 
A.  Kentucky Industrial Development Act (KIDA) 
 
Projects approved under KIDA may receive a state income tax exemption (or 
credit), for up to 10 years, equal to up to 100 percent of annual debt service costs 
(principal and interest) for financing the project.  The debt must be used to finance 
land, buildings, site development, building fixtures, or equipment used in the project.  
Financing may be provided by any source, typically banks, industrial revenue bonds, 
An Analysis of a Proposed New Economic 
Development Incentive 
 
 
14  
or inter-company loans. Alternatively, the company may collect a job assessment fee 
equal to 3 percent of the gross wages of each employee whose job is created by the 
approved project and who is subject to Kentucky income taxes.  (The employee 
receives credits for the job assessment fee against his or her state income taxes.)  
Unused KIDA credits may be carried forward for the term of the agreement.  Total 
KIDA benefits (tax credit and job development assessment fee) cannot exceed the 
original principal amount of debt used to finance the project. 
To be eligible, the project must be a new or expanding manufacturing project 
located in a non-KREDA county.  The project must have a minimum investment of 
$100,000 and must create at least 15 new full-time jobs.  Eligible equipment costs are 
limited to $10,000 per new, full-time job created. 
 
B.  Kentucky Rural Economic Development Act (KREDA) 
 
Companies with projects approved under KREDA may potentially receive 
state income tax credits and job assessment fees for up to 100 percent of annual debt 
service costs, for up to 15 years, associated with the purchase of land, buildings, site 
development, building fixtures and equipment used in the project.  Financing may be 
provided by any source, typically banks, industrial revenue bonds, or inter-company 
loans. The company may also collect a job assessment fee of 4.0 percent of the gross 
wages of each employee whose job is created by the approved project and who is 
subject to Kentucky income taxes.  (The employee receives credits for the fee against 
his or her state income taxes.)  Unused KREDA credits may be carried forward for 
the term of the agreement. 
To be eligible, the project must be a new or expanding manufacturing project 
located in a KREDA-designated county.  The project must have a minimum 
investment of $100,000 and create at least 15 new full-time jobs. Eligible equipment 
costs are limited to $10,000 per new full-time job created.  Total KREDA benefits 
(tax credit and job development assessment fee) cannot exceed the original principal 
amount of debt used to finance the project. 
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C.  Kentucky Job Development Act (KJDA) 
 
KJDA apply to non-manufacturing, non-retail businesses.  KJDA projects 
may receive, for up to ten years, a 100 percent credit against the state income tax 
arising from a project, and may collect a job assessment fee of up to 5.0 percent of 
the gross wages of each employee whose job is created by the project and who is 
subject to Kentucky income taxes. The total incentive amount cannot exceed 50 
percent of project start-up costs (i.e., costs associated with furnishing and equipping 
the facility) plus 50 percent of annual facility rental cost or rental value. The 
maximum approved start-up costs (i.e., the costs associated with furnishing and 
equipping the facility) are $10,000 per new full-time job. The local community must 
approve the project prior to the firm submitting an application for KJDA.  Unused 
credits may be carried forward for the term of the agreement. If the company uses the 
wage assessment, the employee receives credit for the fee against his or her state 
income taxes and local occupational taxes.  
Eligible companies are service or technology related companies and new or 
expanding non-manufacturing, non-retail firms.  Firms must generate more than 75 
percent of their revenue from purchasers located outside Kentucky.  Firms must 
create at least 25 new, full-time jobs for Kentucky residents.  
 
D.  An Example 
 
To illustrate how these programs work, consider the following example.  
Specifically, consider a firm that plans to invest in a new project for which land and 
buildings account for $1.050 million and equipment equals $450,000.  Assume the 
annual rental value of the building is $120,000. Further, suppose the company will 
employ 15 people at an annual wage of $30,000 each.  Assume that the firm finances 
the $1.2 million over 10 years at 7 percent, which results in an annual debt payment 
of about $167,000. Assume that the firm’s net income subject to Kentucky taxation is 
$2 million.  $2 million in net income would produce a corporate income tax liability 
of approximately $160,000 per year for 10 years (the marginal tax rate in Kentucky is 
8.25 percent on net income over $250,000).   
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For the KIDA program eligible investment equals $1.2 million, which is 
comprised of the $1.050 million investment in land and building and $150,000 in 
equipment (the maximum of $10,000 per employee times 15 employees).  Consider 
first the income tax credit option.  Since the debt service of $167,000 exceeds the 
income tax liability, the firm can claim a credit of only $160,000 per year.  The 
$7,000 annual unused credit can be carried forward through the term of the KIDA 
agreement.   
Consider next the job development assessment fee option.  With 15 new 
employees, each paid an annual wage of $30,000, the total increase in salary is 
$450,000.  The firm can receive a job assessment fee of 3 percent of that total in each 
year, or $13,500.  For the KIDA program the firm must choose one of the two 
options.  In this example, the firm would clearly take the tax credit option.   
If the firm had located in a KREDA-designated county, the firm could utilize 
both the tax credit and the job assessment fee up to the maximum eligible amount, 
i.e., $167,000 per year.  Thus, the firm would receive a tax credit of $160,000 per 
year (i.e., 100 percent of the corporate income tax liability).  While the potential 
value of the job assessment fee is $18,000 per year (i.e., 4 percent of the increase in 
wages of $450,000), the firm can claim only $7,000 since the total claim (income tax 
credit and job assessment fee) cannot exceed $167,000.   
If the firm had applied under the KJDA program, the maximum annual 
incentive would be $135,000, i.e., 50 percent of the $120,000 annual rental plus 50 
percent of the allowable $75,000 start up costs. The annual incentive the firm would 
take is thus $135,000. 
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III.  The Kentucky Experience 
 
A.  Credit Applications, Receipts, and Costs 
 
Through Bryan Quinsey we obtained Kentucky incentive program application 
data that were obtained through a freedom of information request.  These data 
provide the potential incentives available for every project and the expected number 
of new jobs for the period 1992 – 1999 for the three incentive programs (only partial 
records were available for 1999).  These are the amounts contained in the application, 
not necessarily the actual incentive taken or jobs created.  For the KREDA program, 
there have been 407 applications (with some firms having multiple applications).  To 
date, the total potential incentives amount to $3.048 billion and the number of new 
jobs expected equals 50,654.  This implies an incentive of $60,173 per new job. For 
the KIDA program, there have been 306 applications.  To date the total potential 
incentives amount to $1.603 billion and the number of new jobs expected equals 
34,856. This implies an incentive of $45,989 per new job.  For the KJDA program, 
there have been 504 applications.  To date the total potential incentives amount to 
$1.321 billion and the number of new jobs expected equals 43,923.  This implies an 
incentive of $30,075 per new job. 
The grand total for all three programs is 1,218 applications, with total 
potential incentives equal to $5.972 billion and potential jobs equal to 129,433.  This 
implies an average incentive of $46,139 per new job. According to an individual 
familiar with the program, these amounts are the incentives the firms could receive, 
but the firms actually earn considerably less than this.  First, the actual project may be 
smaller than originally proposed; second, the state may have limited the total value of 
the incentive that a firm can take, and; third, firms may have decided to locate 
elsewhere or decided not to expand. 
Through our contacts in Kentucky we were able to obtain the value of 
incentives actually taken by year (Table 3).  The information for 1999 is incomplete.  
For 1998, the total value of the incentives taken was $46.4 million for the three 
programs for both types of incentives. 
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TABLE 3.  KENTUCKY DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES TAKEN 
 
Job Assessment Fee Tax Credit Total Incentive 
Year 
KIDA KJDA KREDA KIDA KJDA KREDA KIDA KJDA KREDA 
TOTAL 
1990 $0 $0 $47,428 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $47,428 $47,428 
1991 $0 $0 $330,104 $0 $0 $228,483 $0 $0 $558,587 $558,587 
1992 $0 $0 $785,637 $0 $0 $566,736 $0  $0 $1,352,373 $1,352,373 
1993 $0 $146,505 $1,730,761 $114,163 $365,722 $1,463,821 $114,163 $5122,27 $3,194,582 $3,820,972 
1994 $0 $892,098 $3,447,707 $1,382,793 $256,701 $3,975,351 $1,382,793 $1,148,799 $7,423,058 $9,954,650 
1995 $0 $1,101,740 $5,651,972 $2,636,400 $923,683 $975,556 $2,636,400 $2,025,423 $6,627,528 $11,289,351 
1996 $0 $2,461,540 $7,546,041 $8,069,089 $2,743,448 $5,039,707 $8,069,089 $5,204,988 $12,585,748 $25,859,825 
1997 $52,250 $4,472,123 $11,757,560 $12,593,155 $2,992,247 $8,328,550 $12,645,405 $7,464,370 $20,086,110 $40,195,885 
1998 $204,163 $6,895,082 $17,151,750 $11,925,734 $2,333,904 $7,827,851 $12,129,897 $9,228,986 $24,979,601 $46,338,484 
1999 $218,691 $7,240,104 $18,144,821 $185,842 $265,987 $1,498,834 $404,533 $7,506,091 $19,643,655 $27,554,279 
Source: Office of the State Budget Director, Commonwealth of Kentucky 
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B. Economic Impact of the Kentucky Incentive Program 
 
 We were unable to identify any existing studies that analyze the economic 
effects of the Kentucky incentive programs.  We conducted an analysis that focused 
on changes in per capita income, earnings, and employment. 
 
Per Capita Income and Earnings 
In terms of per capita income and other measures of economic well-being, 
Kentucky and the rest of the Southeast have lagged behind the nation as a whole 
since reconstruction, which makes comparisons of levels of performance over time 
tenuous.  Thus, for comparison purposes, we set the ratio of Kentucky per capita 
income to U.S. per capita income at 100.0 in our base year (1969) and recalculate the 
index for succeeding years relative to that base year.  For example, a value of 105 in 
1979 would indicate that the ratio of per capita income in Kentucky relative to per 
capita income in the rest of the United States increased by 5 percent over the 10-year 
period.  A similar index is used to compare Kentucky economic performance relative 
to that of the Southeast as a whole.  The use of indices also is useful in that natural 
controls for the macroeconomic environment (e.g., recessions) are included in the 
analysis.  Figure 1 shows the value of this per capita income index in the ten-year 
period surrounding the adoption of KIDA, KIRA, and KJDA programs in 1992.  
Figure 2 shows patterns in a related index, namely total private earnings of workers in 
the private sector. 
 
 
An Analysis of a Proposed New Economic 
Development Incentive 
 
 
20  
FIGURE 1.  PER CAPITA INCOME INDEX, KENTUCKY VS. THE SOUTHEAST AND 
UNITED STATES, 1987-1997 (1969=100) 
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FIGURE 2.  PRIVATE EARNINGS, KENTUCKY VS. THE SOUTHEAST AND UNITED 
STATES, 1987-1997 
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 Although the State of Kentucky has seen some improvement in its overall 
economic performance since the inception of its development plans in 1992, as 
measured by per capita income and private earnings, it actually gained considerably 
more ground on the two comparison groups in the previous five-year period, 1987 – 
1992, prior to the adoption of the incentive programs.  When accounting for 
associated changes in population, Kentucky actually lost ground on the Southeast and 
United States between 1992 and 1997.  Together, data on per capita income and 
private earnings suggest that the Kentucky incentive programs did not have a 
noticeable economic impact on the state overall, at least relative to other states in the 
Southeast and to the nation.  
Where Kentucky does seem to have gained substantial ground relative to the 
Southeast and nation as a whole is in manufacturing, as measured by manufacturing 
earnings (Figure 3).  The index measuring Kentucky manufacturing earnings relative 
to the Southeast increased from 94.9 in 1992 to 101.6 in 1997, a change of 
approximately  7.1  percent.  Likewise, the index comparing Kentucky manufacturing 
 
FIGURE 3.  MANUFACTURING EARNINGS, KENTUCKY VS. THE SOUTHEAST AND 
UNITED STATES, 1987-1997 
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earnings to that of the United States increased from 127.8 in 1992 to 134.9 in 1997, a 
gain of 5.6 percent.  Comparable figures for the 1987 – 1992 period reflect index 
gains of 2.4 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. 
 
Employment 
We next investigate the overall employment impact of the Kentucky incentive 
program, again comparing growth in Kentucky to growth in the Southeast and to the 
nation as a whole.  Figures 4 and 5 compare compound annual employment growth 
rates (total private employment and manufacturing employment) in Kentucky, the 
Southeast, and the United States in five-year increments. 
Unsurprisingly, information gleaned from comparisons of employment 
growth rates suggests conclusions similar to those from comparisons of per capita 
income and earnings.  In terms of overall employment growth, Kentucky appears to 
have performed at about the level of the Southeast as a whole, and appears to have 
under-performed relative to the nation as a whole, in the immediate five-year period 
following the initiation of the state’s incentive programs in 1992.  However, 
Kentucky significantly out-performed the Southeast and the nation in manufacturing 
employment growth during the same period, the sector in which the incentives were 
primarily targeted.1  Of course, these results are tempered by the fact that the state 
significantly out-performed the Southeast and the U.S. in manufacturing employment 
growth during the previous five-year period as well (1987 – 1992).  Thus, there is 
little evidence that the growth in employment in Kentucky increased after 1992 
relative to the growth that the nation and the Southeast was experiencing. 
                                                 
1 Kentucky has a relatively large manufacturing employment base (18.6 percent of total private 
employment) compared to the Southeast average (15.6 percent) and the U.S. (14.7 percent). 
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FIGURE 4.  COMPOUND ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT, GROWTH RATES,  
TOTAL (PRIVATE) EMPLOYMENT  
KENTUCKY, SOUTHEAST, & UNITED STATES, 1972-1997 
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FIGURE 5.  COMPOUND ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATES, MANUFACTURING 
KENTUCKY, SOUTHEAST, & UNITED STATES, 1972-1997 
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IV.  Analysis of the Proposed Change  
In this section we present the results of our analysis of the proposed incentive 
program for Georgia.   
 
A.  Calculation of the Value of the Investment Incentive per Worker 
To determine how the value of the existing incentives compares to the 
proposed incentive, and to calculate the total cost of the proposed incentives, we use 
investment per worker.  In this section we discuss the likely value of investment per 
worker and we approach the estimation of the value of the investment per worker in 
three ways.   
First, using information from a data set developed by Peter Fisher and Alan 
Peters, we can calculate the value of investment per worker in manufacturing.2  The 
costs of land, building and equipment are, on average, $77,358 per worker.  The costs 
of just land and building are, on average, $20,279 per worker.   
Second, the incentive per worker for applications for the KREDA program is 
$60,173.  The KREDA program comes closest in design to the proposed program.  
However, the KREDA program’s income tax credit per job is lower than what would 
be available under the proposed Georgia program since the KREDA program limits 
eligible equipment to $10,000 per worker.  We believe that the average equipment 
per worker is much higher than that in manufacturing.   
Third, from the Department of Industry, Trade and Tourism we obtained a 
file listing all of the new projects in Georgia for the period 1990 – 2001, regardless of 
industry.  This data file includes the expected value of the investment and the 
expected employment.  The average firm had a reported investment per worker of 
$81,453.   
Based on these three estimates, the implied investment per worker in 
manufacturing would be between $60,173 and $81,450 for the typical firm.  Based on 
these calculations, a reasonable value of investment per worker is $70,000.  For non-
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the data, see Fisher and Peters (1998). 
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manufacturing, non-retail firms we use an investment per worker of $30,000, which 
is the approximate average investment for the KJDA program. 
 
B.  Comparison of the Values of the Proposed Incentive  
with the Current Incentives 
 
In order to determine whether firms will choose the proposed incentive or the 
existing incentive, we need to compare the value of the two programs.  In comparing 
the two programs we consider the existing programs to be the Job Tax Credit and 
either the Investment Tax Credit or the Optional Investment Tax Credit.   
Under the assumption that the firm can take full advantage of either incentive 
and that the firm is eligible for the Optional Investment Tax Credit, the value of the 
new incentive is larger provided the investment per worker is not too small.  Consider 
a firm in Tier 1 with an investment of $19,000 per worker.  The value of the proposed 
incentive is thus $19,000.  Under the current BEST program the firm gets a Job Tax 
Credit of $3,500 for each of five years and a 10 percent Investment Tax Credit, for a 
total incentive of $19,400.  So, in this situation the firm does better under the BEST 
program.  If the investment per worker is greater than $19,425 in Tier 1, $13,586 in 
Tier 2, $6,648 in Tier 3, and $3,989 in Tier 4, then the incentive is larger under the 
proposed incentive than under the existing program.  While there will be firms with 
investment per worker less than $19,425 per worker, we expect most new projects, 
particularly in manufacturing to have investments greater than $19,425 per worker. 
However, firms may not be able to take full advantage of either incentive.  
One issue raised regarding the current incentive program is that many firms do not 
have the corporate tax liability to be able to take advantage of the incentive.  This was 
the principal reason that the State changed the provisions for the Job Tax Credit for 
Tier 1 so that firms could use income tax withholding to capture the credit.  We 
therefore consider how the value of the incentives will differ if the firm does not have 
substantial corporate tax liabilities.  We consider several alternative scenarios.    
Consider a firm that meets the minimum job creation and investment 
requirements for the Optional Investment Tax Credit.  Assume that the firm pays a 
salary of $30,000, that the income tax withholding is $1,310 per year, and that 
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investment per worker is $70,000.  Note that the average production worker in 
manufacturing in Georgia earned $26,835 in 2000, and that the annual state income 
tax withholding for a single individual with an annual gross income of $30,000 is 
$1,310 (the effective tax rate is 4.4 percent).3  
For Tier 1, currently the eligible firm can take a job tax credit of $3500 per 
worker against the firm’s income tax liability for each of five years, with a carry 
forward of unused credits for another five years.  If the firm’s tax liability per worker 
is less than $3500, then the firm can retain up to 100 percent of the personal income 
tax withholding.  Thus, the maximum job tax credit a firm can receive under the 
existing program is $3500 per worker per year.  Under the proposed program and 
without any corporate income tax liability the firm could take a maximum of $1,310, 
i.e., the assumed amount of income tax withholding.  Under the current job tax credit 
firms in Tier 1 can claim the job tax credit against total income tax withholding, 
while under the proposed program the firm can claim the withholding allowance 
(ITWA) only against the increase in withholding due to the increase in employment.  
 Table 4 summarizes the effect per new worker for firms in each tier under 
nine alternative assumptions regarding tax liability and total income tax withholding.  
For alternatives A, B, and C, it is assumed that the firm has no corporate income tax 
liability.  For alternative D, E, and F the corporate income tax liability per worker is 
set equal to the assumed value of income tax withholding per worker, while for 
alternatives G, H, and I the tax liability per worker equals the job tax credit available 
in Tier 1.   
 For alternatives A, B, and C, a Tier 1 firm would not do better under the 
proposed incentive program.  For all of the other cases, the proposed incentive 
has a larger incentive than the BEST program.  The magnitude of the difference 
in the incentive amounts depends upon the corporate tax liability.  Thus, as one 
moves from 
                                                 
3 A full 6 percent on $30,000 would be $1,800; however, that does not allow for personal 
exemptions, deductions, and for the lower tax rates that apply to the first $7,000 in taxable 
income.  For someone with an annual salary of $30,000 and with spouse and one child, the 
withholding would be $990 per year. 
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TABLE 4.  ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGES FOR ONE NEW WORKER FOR 
NINE  HYPOTHETICAL FIRM 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Alternative 
Assumptions 
A B C D E F G H I 
Withholding per 
worker per year $1,310 $1,310 $1,310 $1,310 $1,310 $1,310 $1,310 $1,310 $1,310 
Tax liability per new 
worker per year 0 0 0 $1,310 $1,310 $1,310 $3,500 $3,500 $3,500 
Total withholding 
from all other 
employees per new 
employee per year 0 $9,000 $18,000 0 $9,000 $18,000 0 $9,000 $18,000 
Tier 1          
BEST credit $13,100 $17,500 $17,500 $24,500 $24,500 $24,500 $24,500 $24,500 $24,500 
Proposed Program $13,100 $13,100 $13,100 $26,200 $26,200 $26,200 $48,100 $48,100 $48,100 
Change 0 -$4,440 -$4,440 $1,700 $1,700 $1,700 $23,600 $23,600 $23,600 
Tier 2          
Best credit 0 0 0 $13,100 $13,100 $13,100 $18,100 $18,100 $18,100 
Proposed Program $10,480 $10,480 $10,480 $23,580 $23,580 $23,580 $45,480 $45,480 $45,480 
Change $10,480 $10,480 $10,480 $10,480 $10,480 $10,480 $27,380 $27,380 $27,380 
Tier 3          
BEST credit 0 0 0 $6,550 $6,550 $6,550 $10,450 $10,450 $10,450 
Proposed Program $7,860 $7,860 $7,860 $20,960 $20,960 $20,960 $42,860 $42,860 $42,860 
Change $7,860 $7,860 $7,860 $14,410 $14,410 $14,410 $32,410 $32,410 $32,410 
Tier 4          
BEST credit 0 0 0 $6,550 $6,550 $6,550 $6,550 $6,550 $6,550 
Proposed Program $5,240 $5,240 $5,240 $19,650 $19,650 $19,650 $24,050 $24,050 $24,050 
Change $5,240 $5,240 $5,240 $13,100 $13,100 $13,100 $17,500 $17,500 $17,500 
1. The value of the incentive for the existing and proposed program equal the maximum the firm can claim given the tier, tax liability, 
withholding amount, and an assumed investment per worker of $70,000. The amount of the incentives is the total over the duration of 
the incentive (we did not discount the flow of incentive benefits) for each new worker added by the firm. 
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left to right across the table, the difference becomes larger.  The difference also 
increases as one moves down the table from Tier 1 through Tier 3, but then the 
difference decreases for Tier 4. 
 
C.  Total Value of Credits Taken 
 
We estimate the total value of the proposed incentive that might be taken 
under two alternative assumptions.  First, we consider a situation in which the State 
allows all firms that satisfy the eligibility requirements to take the maximum 
incentive they are allowed given their corporate income tax liability and personal 
income tax withholding.  We refer to this as the entitlement assumption.  Second, we 
consider the situation in which the State decides on the incentives a firm will receive 
on a case-by-case basis.  We refer to this as the discretionary assumption.   
 
Assumption A: Entitlement Assumption 
 
We first consider the total cost of the proposed program if the state allows all 
eligible firms to take as much of the incentive as they can, i.e., up to the amount of 
the firm’s eligible corporate tax liability and income tax withholding.  We develop 
our estimate based on investment per worker.  The first step is to calculate the 
increase in the number of workers in firms that are eligible for the proposed 
investment incentive.  Given the likely investment per worker, most firms that satisfy 
the requirement for increasing the number of workers will also satisfy the minimum 
investment requirement. 
We have calculated the average annual number of workers for which firms in 
each tier would have qualified for the proposed incentive over the period 1998 – 
2000, the average annual salary of these workers, and based on average effective 
Georgia personal income tax rates (Table 5), their subsequent personal income tax 
liabilities.  
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TABLE 5.  AVERAGE PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATES IN GEORGIA,  
BY INCOME CLASS 
Income Class Range Avg Tax Rate (%) 
1st Quintile < 23K 0.9 
2nd Quintile 23K – 39K 2.8 
3rd Quintile 39K – 52K 3.5 
4th Quintile 52K – 74K 3.8 
5th Quintile:  Next 15% 74K – 126K 4.0 
5th Quintile:  Next 4% 126K – 396K 4.0 
5th Quintile:  Next 1% > 396K 4.6 
Source: ITEP Personal Income Tax Model, as reported in Citizens for Tax 
Justice and The Institute on Taxation & Economic Policy, “Who Pays? A 
Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States,” 1996. 
 
 
Using data available from the Fiscal Research Program’s ES-202 database, 
we identified each Georgia business that increased employment by the threshold 
required for their respective tiers, whether they be new or expanding businesses, and 
hence would have qualified for the proposed program.  We then averaged the annual 
number of eligible workers over the 1998 – 2000 period for each tier.  The results of 
these calculations are reported by tier and broad industry group in Table 6, along with 
the number of establishments and associated average weekly wage for each group. 
Tier 3, which includes 35 (22 percent) of Georgia’s 159 counties,4 enjoyed by 
far the greatest number of new workers that would have qualified their employer for 
the proposed incentive.  Over the 1998 – 2000 period, an average of 1,464 firms in 
Tier 3 would have met the criteria, employing roughly 82,286 new workers, of which 
72,789 were non-manufacturing, non-retail.  The applicable number of non-
manufacturing, non-retail workers per year in Tiers 1, 2, and 4 are 11,910, 18,326, 
and 30,529, respectively.    
From DITT’s list of project we calculated that for the period 1995-2000, the 
annual average total investment was about $5.5 billion.  If all of these projects were 
eligible for the proposed incentive, if firms had no limit on their ability to take the 
full value of the investment incentive, and if all firms took the incentive, then the 
annual cost of the proposed incentive would be $5.5 billion.  We estimate that about 
                                                 
4 There are 71 counties in Tier 1, 35 counties in each of Tiers 2 and 3, and 18 counties in Tier 4. 
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$1.6 billion would be the total potential cost of the incentives if just manufacturing 
firms were eligible.  (This figure was derived by multiplying $70,000, which is the 
assumed investment per worker, times the number of new workers in manufacturing 
as reported in Table 6.)   
Doing a similar calculation for non-manufacturing, non-retail firms, and 
assuming, based on our analysis, that only 75 percent of these firms will satisfy the 
condition that 75 percent of their sales will be out-of-state, we estimate a potential 
cost of $2.5 billion.  The sum of these estimates is $4.1 billion, which is somewhat 
smaller than the total value of new projects, i.e., $5.5 billion.  
Many firms may not have sufficient corporate income tax liability and income 
tax withholding to take the entire incentive.  To calculate the total annual amount of 
income tax withholding that might be available to firms eligible for the proposed 
incentives, we used the data in Tables 5 and 6 to estimate the available ITWA for the 
proposed incentive.  The results of which are reported in Table 7. 
 
TABLE 6.  NEW AND EXPANDING BUSINESSES IN GEORGIA,  
MEETING KIP EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS, 1998 – 2000 AVERAGE 
Tier 1 Counties 
Establishments with 5+ New Employees 
(New and Expanding) 
Tier 2 Counties 
Establishments with 10+ New Employees 
(New and Expanding) 
Industry Estab. Avg. Wage New Empl Industry Estab. Avg. Wage New Empl
Manufacturing 172 491.59 4,483 Manufacturing 132 530.56 5,392
Retail 184 210.43 2,558 Retail 145 272.04 4,223
NonMan/NonRet 442 334.96 7,426 NonMan/NonRet 355 347.14 12,934
Total 798 361.45 14,468 Total 632 371.01 22,549
Tier 3 Counties 
Establishments with 15+ New Employees 
(New and Expanding) 
Tier 4 Counties 
Establishments with 25+ New Employees 
(New and Expanding) 
Industry Estab. Avg. Wage New Empl Industry Estab. Avg. Wage New Empl
Manufacturing 164 712.01 7,778 Manufacturing 80 733.34 5,643
Retail 240 342.20 9,497 Retail 88 506.06 6,441
NonMan/NonRet 1,060 714.38 65,010 NonMan/NonRet 359 573.16 24,885
Total 1,464 671.19 82,286 Total 526 585.90 36,970
Source: Fiscal Research Program calculations using the ES-202 database 
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TABLE 7.  ESTIMATED REVENUE LOSSES, INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING COMPONENT 
Industry 
(% of income tax 
withholding) 
Tier 1 
(100%) 
Tier 2 
(80%) 
Tier 3 
(60%) 
Subtotal 
Tiers 1-3 
Tier 4 
(40%) Grand Total 
Manufacturing 3,208,970 3,332,256 4,838,234 11,379,460 2,410,241 13,789,701 
Non-Manufacturing / 
Non-Retail 1,164,173 1,681,053 40,571,868 43,417,094 8,306,774 51,723,868 
All Firms 4,373,143 5,013,309 45,410,102 54,796,554 10,717,015 65,513,569 
 
 We estimate that the maximum ITWA available to manufacturing firms is 
$13.8 million per year.  However, not all firms are likely to take the credit.  A 
reasonable estimate of the participation rate among eligible firms in the proposed 
program is 60 percent.  Thus, the likely value of ITWA taken per year would be 
$8.23 million.  This amount could be taken for each of 10 years; in any given year 
there will be firms taking the incentives for the first time and firms taking incentives 
for the 10th time.  Thus, the annual cost after the program has been in place for ten 
years will be $82.3 million. This is substantially less than the $1.6 billion maximum 
potential reported above.  
If non-manufacturing, non-retail firms are also eligible for the proposed 
incentive program, we estimate an additional cost of the proposed program of $294.8 
million.  (This assumes, based on our analysis, that only 75 percent of the non-
manufacturing, non-retail firms meet the requirement that 75 percent of sales be made 
out of state, and assumes a 60 percent participation rate.)  These estimates do not 
consider the increase in employment that might result from the larger incentives.   
In addition to the ITWA, firms can use their corporate tax liability to take the 
proposed investment incentive.  To investigate the extent to which firms may have 
the income tax liability to take the investment tax credit, we used corporate income 
tax data to estimate the tax liability of firms that created a minimum number of jobs.  
(We have no way of determining whether these firms had the required minimum 
investment, but if the firms create the minimum number of jobs, they are very likely 
to meet the minimum investment requirement.)  For firms that created at least five 
new jobs, we estimate that the total income tax liability is $9.9 million.  For firms that 
created 25 or more jobs, we estimate the total tax liability for these firms to be $7.8 
million.  In any given year, there will be firms taking the incentives for the first time 
and firms taking incentives for the 10th time.  Thus, we multiple these annual amounts 
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by 10 to get an estimate of the total income tax liability for exemption under the 
income tax credit part of the proposed program.  Thus, the total tax liability available 
for the exemption is between $78 million and $99 million.  While some firms may 
not have sufficient income tax liability to take full advantage of the income tax credit, 
in the aggregate, the investment tax credit proportion of the proposed incentive 
program could reach $78 to $99 million per year.   
To estimate the available tax liability to take the credit for just manufacturing 
firms, we multiply by the percentage of workers who are in manufacturing, i.e., by 
15.6 percent. Assuming a participation rate of 60 percent, we estimate the likely 
annual cost of the corporate income tax credit component for manufacturing firms to 
be $7.3 million to $9.2 million per year.  Doing a similar calculation for non-
manufacturing, non-retail firms, again assuming that only 75 percent of non-
manufacturing, non-retail firms satisfy the condition that 75 percent of sales must be 
made to out-of-state buyers, the implied revenue loss is $22.0 million to $27.9 
million. 
Thus, combining the two components, i.e., the ITWA and the investment tax 
credit, the estimated total annual revenue loss to the State, assuming that the State 
allows all eligible firms to take as much incentive as feasible, is between $89.6 
million and $91.5 million for manufacturing firms, and between $316.8 million and 
$322.7 million for non-manufacturing, non-retail firms. 
 
 Estimation of Discretionary Program 
It is not possible to predict how restrictive the State would be in allowing 
firms to take the incentives.  However, Kentucky’s program is discretionary, and so 
we can estimate the revenue cost to Georgia if Georgia was as restrictive as Kentucky 
has been. Employment in Georgia is 2.2 times as large as in Kentucky, and between 
1989 and 2000, employment increased by 32 percent in Georgia and by 16 percent in 
Kentucky, or twice as rapidly.  The KREDA program is closest to the proposed 
program, but there are some differences with the proposed program.  KREDA is 
restricted to certain counties and to manufacturing firms, so the value of the KREDA 
has to be increased for it to reflect the entire state and all industries.  To get a 
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statewide estimated value of the incentives, we take the $25.0 million in KREDA 
benefits for 1998 and use the relative number of jobs associated with the KREDA in 
the application data to inflate the KREDA to get a statewide estimate.  The result is 
$63.8 million.  Multiplying this by 2.2 yields $140.4 million.  
KREDA allows 100 percent of the investment to be applied to the income tax 
exemption, while the proposed program has a declining percentage across the tiers.  
To adjust for this, and since most of the jobs are created in Tiers 3 and 4, we take 60 
percent of the $140.4.  This yields an estimate of the annual revenue loss of $84.2 
million for just manufacturing firms, which is only slightly smaller than the 
approximately $90 million estimate of the potential cost.   The estimate may be 
smaller than what Georgia might expect since the minimum number of new jobs 
required in the KREDA program is 15, which is higher than required in Georgia for 
Tiers 1 and 2.  We do not adjust the estimate for that difference. 
 
Summary of Estimates 
The revenue loss to the state will depend upon how restrictive the State is in 
granting incentives to eligible firms and whether non-manufacturing, non-retail firms 
are eligible.  If the State exercises the same discretion as Kentucky has, we estimate 
the cost of the proposed program for just manufacturing firms to be $84.2 million per 
year.  Allowing non-manufacturing, non-retail firms to take the credit could increase 
the cost by an additional $317 million to $323 million, but that could well be less if 
the State exercised its discretion and restricted the number of non-manufacturing, 
non-retail firms that were granted incentives.  
 
D.  Effect of the Proposed Program on State Revenue 
In this subsection we present an analysis of the additional revenue, less 
additional expenditures, that the state government will receive from the increase in 
economic activity due to the jobs created by the proposed incentive.  To estimate the 
net revenue effect from an additional incentive requires the following information.  
First, we need to know whether the project that receives an incentive under the 
proposed program would have located in the state without the incentive. Second, we 
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need to know whether the jobs created directly and indirectly (i.e., through the 
multiplier effect) are taken by current residents or individuals who move into the 
State to take the jobs.  For the former, the State is already covering the services 
provided to those residents.  Thus, if the jobs go to current residents, the State gets 
the additional revenue and has no additional expenditures.  For individuals who move 
into the State, the State will get addition revenue, but will also have to increase 
expenditures, e.g., to provide education for the new residents’ children.  Our analysis 
suggests that the growth in jobs between 1985 and 1990 was approximately equal to 
the increase in workers who moved into the State during that period. However, it is 
possible and likely that if several new jobs are created, some will go to current 
residents and some to new residents.  Mindful of this, we produce estimates under 
two alternative scenarios: first, that all jobs go to new residents, and second, that only 
50 percent of new jobs go to new residents. 
Third, in order to determine the number of jobs that are subsequently created 
through the multiplier effect, we need to know the industry in which the original job 
was created.  We adopt two assumptions.  First, we assume that jobs are created in 
manufacturing industries in proportion to the actual job growth in those industries.  
Second, we assume that jobs are created in all eligible industries in proportion to the 
actual job growth in those industries. (Eligible industries here are those that are 
eligible in all tiers.)   
Fourth, we need to know the increase in State tax revenues that result from a 
new job, and in the case of a new resident, the additional State expenditures.  The 
Center for Economic Development Services at Georgia Institute of Technology has 
estimated these numbers as part of the development of a State-level LOCI (for Local 
Impact) model.  The model, which includes the multiplier effects of a new job, 
provides estimates of the additional revenue and expenditures.  
To measure the fiscal effect of a job created by the new incentives, we first 
determine the fiscal effects of a new job in each of the eligible industries.  We then 
create a weighted average by multiplying these fiscal effects by the fraction of the 
actual growth in jobs in the relevant industries.  The result is a measure of the net 
fiscal effect of a typical new job created because of the incentive.  
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The two scenarios regarding who gets new jobs and the two scenarios 
regarding the industry in which the new job is located yield four alternatives sets of 
assumptions.  Table 8 shows for each assumption the net fiscal benefit (additional 
revenue less additional expenditures) to the State per year per job created by the 
incentive, gross of the value of the incentive.  As can be seen, under the assumption 
that all jobs go to new residents and using the weighted average of the fiscal effect 
across all eligible industries the net fiscal benefit to the State, gross of the incentive, 
is $794 per year.  If we use the weighted average of the fiscal effect across just 
manufacturing industries, the net fiscal effect, gross of the incentive, falls to $359.   
The net fiscal effect, gross of the incentive, increases substantially under the 
assumption that half of the jobs go to current residents. 
 
TABLE 8.  FISCAL BENEFIT TO THE STATE FROM ONE NEW JOB 
Assumption 
Net Fiscal Benefit to State 
Government Per Year Per Job 
Job growth equal to actual, new jobs 
go to non-resident $794 
Job growth equal to actual in 
manufacturing, new jobs go to non-
resident 
$359 
Job growth equal to actual, half of 
new jobs go to non-resident $6,045 
Job growth equal to actual in 
manufacturing, half new jobs go to 
non-resident 
$5,936 
 
The fiscal benefit net of the incentive depends upon how well the State does 
in awarding incentives only to firms that would not otherwise have located in 
Georgia.  If the State does a perfect job, then each job can be credited to the 
incentive.  In that case the net fiscal benefit described in Table 8 can be associated 
with each job that receives an incentive.  But if the State does an extremely bad job of 
picking firm to which it provides an incentive, i.e., incentives go to firms that would 
have located in Georgia without the incentive, then little of the benefits described in 
Table 8 can be credited to the incentives.   
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A previous report provided estimates of the number of job tax credits that 
resulted in new jobs.5  That estimate was that 30 percent of the credits were for new 
jobs.  Thus, if the State were to grant an incentive to every firm that applied, we 
would expect that it would be a “success” 30 percent of the time, where success 
means giving an incentive to a firm that would not have otherwise located in Georgia. 
It is an open question as to whether the State could be more successful than that, and 
it is possible that it could do worse.   
Based on the analysis above, we assume that the investment per worker will 
be about $70,000 per worker.  But the typical firm will not be able to take full 
advantage of the incentive because of limited corporate income tax liability and 
income tax withholding.  We assume that 25 percent of the incentive will be taken by 
the firm.  Thus, the typical incentive would be about $1750 per worker.  This is 
higher than the first two entries in Table 8.  However, if 50 percent of the new jobs 
are taken by current Georgia residents, then the incentive would yield a positive fiscal 
benefit, net of the incentive, to the State if one out of three firms that the State gave 
incentive to would not have located in Georgia in the absence of the incentive.   
 
E.  Other Benefits of Development Incentives 
There are many benefits from creating new jobs beyond simply the revenue to 
the state. These benefits, which are not quantifiable, are discussed below.   
 
Job Creation 
One of the principal objectives of the tax credit program is the creation of a 
new job.  The value of the benefit of this new job can be obtained by answering the 
question, how much would the State be willing to pay for one more job, even if the 
job generates no additional tax revenues?  The benefit of creating a job depends on 
where it is located, what it pays, and who receives it.  A new job in the rural part of 
the state is undoubtedly worth more than an additional job in the Atlanta metropolitan 
area because of the high growth rate in the Atlanta area.  And, certainly a job paying 
                                                 
5 See Faulk, et al. (2000). 
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$14.00 an hour is worth more than one paying $6.00 an hour.  Finally, a job going to 
a current unemployed resident is worth more than if the job goes to someone moving 
in from out of state.   
 
Improved Business Climate 
The existence of the tax incentives improves the perception of the business 
climate in the State.  One of the aspects of the attractiveness of a site is the perception 
of how friendly government is toward business.  The provision of tax incentives is 
one such indicator.  Furthermore, as noted in Appendix A, site location specialists use 
the existence of economic development incentives as one factor in site decision.  The 
site decision is actually a multi-step process in which sites are eliminated in each 
round of consideration based on increasingly refined criteria.  It is thought that to 
make it very far in the winnowing process, tax credits and other incentives must be in 
place.   
 
Synergistic or Clustering Effects 
The tax credit incentives may attract a firm in an industry new to the state and 
which serves as a magnet for attracting additional firms in the industry.  This benefit, 
which is separate from the multiplier effect, means that it is easier in the future to 
attract other firms in that industry.  However, given that the tax credits are not highly 
targeted and by themselves are not likely to attract a major firm in a highly desired 
industry, these benefits are likely to be quite small for the tax credit incentives. 
 
F.  Other Issues 
The proposal would require an application.  The state would review the 
application and determine the maximum incentive allowed.  This adds to the 
complexity and costs that do not exist in the current program.  However, given that 
the magnitude of the incentive would be significantly increased, this review is 
probably necessary.  However, this is a fundamental change from the entitlement 
program of BEST to a discretionary program. 
An additional eligibility requirement is added, namely a minimum investment 
per new employee.  The proposed value of the minimum investment is small, i.e., 
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$10,000 per new worker if there is just the minimum number of workers.  Thus, we 
expect it is to have little effect on the total number of firms that are eligible.  We 
expect that few service sector firms will qualify since the capital to labor ratio is 
small in many of these firms.  Firms that add workers as part of a second shift will 
not likely qualify.   
Basing the income tax withholding allowance on the amount of withholding 
means that the value of the incentive will vary with the filing status of the worker.  
Since individuals who are single are likely to have the largest withholding for any 
given salary, the program provides an incentive for the firm to hire singles rather than 
married workers.  The program also provides an incentive for the firm to encourage 
the worker to take extra withholding.   
There does not appear to be any new legal barriers to adopting the proposed 
program.  The existing BEST program allows income tax credits and, at least in Tier 
1, allows firms to retain payroll withholding. Thus, the proposed program adds no 
new components.  However, this is not a legal opinion. 
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V.  Update on Incentives in Southeastern States 
 In a previous report we provided a review of economic development 
incentives offered in Southeastern states.6  Here we list selected changes that have 
been made to the incentives in these states.  Georgia’s recent change in its BEST 
program, with its focus on rural areas, and the initiation of the One Georgia program 
are among the noteworthy of the changes in the Southeast.  
 
A.  Alabama 
 Alabama's corporate income tax was substantially modified effective January 
1, 2001.  Pursuant to a constitutional amendment approved by voters on March 21, 
2000, the corporate income tax rate was increased from 5 percent to its current rate of 
6.5 percent. 
 Credit for investment in Alabama State Port Authority: Legislation in 
2001 offers tax credit incentives for new and existing business who invest in the 
Alabama State Port Authority infrastructure.  A qualifying project must have a capital 
cost of not less than $8 million and the predominant trade or business activity 
conducted must constitute industrial, warehousing, or research activity. The credit 
will be against any Alabama income tax liability generated by an investment will be 
equal to 5 percent of the capital costs annually for 20 years.  Each taxpayer wishing 
to claim the credit must obtain the prior written approval of the Governor, Finance 
Director, and Alabama State Port Authority and must also file with the Department of 
Revenue.  The sum of the capital credit may not exceed the capital costs of the 
project and will not be available for new projects after December 31, 2005 unless 
continued by the legislature.  (Alabama Code Sections 40-9B-3, 40-9B-6, and 40-9B-
9.) 
 Tax credits for rural development: A new law provides tax credits to 
businesses locating or expanding in rural or undeveloped counties.  The law provides 
the criteria for such counties (change in population, per capita income, and percent of 
employment) and the eligibility requirements for receiving the tax credits.  The 
                                                 
6See Thomas (2000).  
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investment must be $500,000 or more and the predominant trade or business activity 
conducted must be industrial, warehousing, or research activities.   Effective 2001.  
(Alabama Code Section 40-18-190 and 40-18-193.) 
 
B.  Florida 
Enterprise Zone Program: HB 1225 in 2001 was a substantial rewrite of the 
Enterprise Zone Program which grew from an assessment and recommendations of 
the previous law by the Senate Committee on Commerce and Economic 
Opportunities.  It includes provisions for community development, workforce 
education, comprehensive planning, and economic development, as well as $2.8 
million appropriation.  The new law affects both rural and urban zones by making the 
jobs tax credits against sales and corporate income taxes dependent upon the creation 
of new full-time jobs rather than being based upon the hiring of new individuals into 
existing jobs.  The bill doubles the value of the previous incentive and provides the 
incentive for two years instead of one, which is intended to provide four times the 
current incentive value for the creation of a new job.  In addition, there are new 
provisions for which a taxpayer may receive a credit of 50 percent against sales taxes 
for a community contribution.  This is an alternative to the present corporate income 
tax or insurance premium tax credit.  The sales tax refund may be submitted for the 
prior 12 months without waiting a year for the credit.  With respect to rural areas, the 
bill triples the value of the jobs tax credit for rural areas and provides the incentive 
for two years instead of one, which provides a rural business with six times the 
current value of the tax credit for full-time job creation.  The bill defines rural zones 
and authorizes their expansion to reflect rural land usage patters and population 
densities.  It revises some existing rural economic development programs in order to 
duplicate the package-of-incentives approach that appears to be successful in urban 
enterprise zones.  The new statute adds broadband communications investments to 
the “eligible project” list for the community contribution tax program if a project 
increases access to high-speed broadband capability in rural communities with 
enterprise zones.  In addition, Quick Action Closing Funds are made available to 
allow a privately owned broadband infrastructure investment to receive state funds if 
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the project increases capacity in a rural zone.  With respect to housing, the act 
addresses the effects of gentrification by creating incentives for property owners to 
sell rental property in distressed areas to low-income residents. 
 
C.  Kentucky 
Kentucky Economic Opportunity Zone Credit (KEOZ)  This Act focuses 
on qualified development in  areas with high unemployment and poverty levels.  A 
qualified zone consists of 1 to 5 contiguous census tracts but not more than one per 
county. KREDA-certified counties are exempt from the census tract criteria and may 
have the entire county certified as a zone.  Eligible companies include new or 
expanded firms in manufacturing, service, or technology industries which invest at 
least $100,000 in the project and create at least ten new full-time jobs for residents of 
the zone.  An approved company may receive up to a 100 percent credit against 
income tax liability created by the project.  The carry forward period is 10 years. 
(KRS 54.23-005 through 154.23-079, Acts 2000, ch 528 Section 2, effective 
7/14/00.) 
Basic Skills Employee Training Credit:  Under this program a credit is 
allowed for corporations that assist certain full-time employees to complete a 
qualified high school equivalency diploma program.  The credit is equal to 50 percent 
of a portion of the hours released for employees’ study multiplied by their hourly 
salary, not to exceed $1,250 per employee.  Effective 7/14/00. (KRS 151B.127, Acts 
2000, ch 526, Section 12.) 
Coal Incentive Credit: To qualify for this credit, a taxpayer must use more 
Kentucky coal in the production of electricity than was used in 1999.  The credit 
equals $2 per ton of qualifying coal used.  The law is applicable to returns filed after 
July 15, 2001 and the credit sunsets in 2011. (KRS Chapter 131.) 
Governor’s Vetoes: In 2000, the Governor vetoed two economic 
development bills: (1) HB 902, which would have amended the requirements for 
technology businesses to receive tax credits; (2) HB 201, which would have amended 
KREDA particular certification qualifications. 
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D.  North Carolina 
The Department of Commerce was required to study the effect of tax 
incentives on tax equity. [N.C. General Statutes 105-129.2A] These studies are noted 
in the bibliography and may be accessed through www.commerce.state.nc.us/ 
publicaffairs/. 
 Amendments to the William S. Lee Act: Included in the changes to the Act 
in 1999 are the following provisions:  (1) the sunset on Act was extended from 2002 
to 2007; (2) credits to customer service centers and electronic mail order houses in 
Tier 1 and 2 were added, effective January 1, 2000; (3) an annual refund of 6 percent 
sales taxes paid on capitalized machinery and equipment sold to eligible businesses in 
Tiers 1 or 2 was added; (4) more favorable tier designations were provided for small 
counties, effective January 2000; (5) a 25 percent credit is available for contributions 
to nonprofits for capital projects within development zones, effective January 2000; 
(6) credits are allowed against insurance premiums tax (in addition to corporate 
income and franchise tax), effective January 1999; (7) businesses must provide a 
portion of health insurance costs and meet environmental, safety, and health 
standards in order to qualify for credits, effective January 2000; (8) the application 
fee for credits in Tiers 1 and 2 is eliminated while the fee is increased to $500 per 
credit in other tiers, with a cap of $1,500 per applicant; (9) applications for credits 
must provide additional information to enable the Department of Commerce to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the credits in development zones, effective July 1999; 
and (10) credits for interstate air carriers were clarified. In addition to the changes in 
the Lee Act, a credit (equal to 25 percent of the federal credit) was created for 
rehabilitating or constructing affordable housing. Effective January 2000. 
In 2000, the Lee Act was amended to change “central administrative office” 
to “central office or aircraft facility”, adding aircraft facilities to businesses eligible 
for credits.  Another exception to county tier designations was made in 2000.  These 
exceptions are for small counties to extend the re-designation provision for counties 
unless their new (better) status is maintained for two years. 
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E.  South Carolina 
Community Development Corporation Investment Credit: Code Section 
12-6-3530 has been added to provide an income tax, bank tax, or insurance premium 
tax credit equal to 33 percent of an investment (with some exceptions) in a 
community development corporation or community development financial 
institution.  The total credit that may be claimed by all taxpayers is $1 million in one 
year and $5 million for all years.  Any unused credit may be carried forward;, 
however, the carry forward must be used before the taxable year that begins on or 
after 10 years from the date of the acquisition of stock or other equity interest that is 
the basis for the credit.  The term “community development corporation”   (Code 
Section 34-43-20(2)) means a nonprofit corporation that has a primary mission of 
developing and improving low-income communities and neighborhoods through 
economic and related development.  This act is effective in tax years beginning after 
2000 and the provisions terminate on June 30, 2005. (Act No. A314, Senate Bill 80, 
2000.) 
Job Development Credits:  These amendments provide changes to some 
definitions in the law, modifications to criteria that a business must satisfy to qualify 
for benefits, and some changes in procedures for claiming the job development credit.  
Effective August 17, 2000. (Act No A399, Senate Bill 575, Sections 3.A.2 and 3.B.1. 
through 6.)   
Job Tax Credit - Technology Intensive Facility: Job tax credits for certain 
businesses creating new full time jobs has been expanded to include “technology 
intensive facilities” as a qualifying type of business as defined. Effective June 30, 
2001.  (Act No A283, HB 3782, Sections 5.A. and B.)  In addition, job development 
credits for technology facilities are included for Enterprise Zones. (Act No. A283, 
HB 3782, Sections 5D.E. and F., 2000.) 
Corporate Tax Moratorium Code Section 12-6-3365 has been added to 
grant a 10-year, or in some cases a 15-year, moratorium on a taxpayer’s corporate 
income tax that represents the ratio of the company’s new investment in the 
qualifying county to its total South Carolina investment.  The moratorium begins the 
first full taxable year after the taxpayer qualifies and ends either at the earlier of (a) 
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10 years from that date, or (b) the year when the taxpayers number of new full time 
jobs falls below 100.  The moratorium is available to a taxpayer who: (1) creates and 
maintains at least 100 new full times jobs within five years from the date it creates the 
first new full time job; (2) creates a maintains the new full time jobs at a facility in a 
specified county with low unemployment and per capita income; and (3) places at 
least 90 percent of its investment in South Carolina in the qualifying county.  If the 
taxpayer creates and maintains at least 200 new full time jobs within five years, the 
moratorium period is extended to 15 years.  The effective date is for tax years 
beginning after 1999 and provisions are repealed July 1, 2005.  (Act No A277, Senate 
Bill 1210, Section 1.) 
Fee-in-lieu tax revisions: These changes seek to simplify and clarify the 
provisions of the fee program to make explicit the General Assembly’s intent that 
businesses be afforded broad flexibility in their choice of financing techniques.  The 
legislation also allows two businesses, which are not part of a controlled group, 
which are involved in a simple project to execute a single fee-in-lieu with a county 
where the aggregate investment equals or exceeds the statutory minimum which is $5 
million within five years.  This does not expand the incentive itself.  Effective May 
2000. (South Carolina Code Sections 4-12-10 and 4-12-30.) 
 
F.  Tennessee 
Business enterprise investment: If a business enterprise makes a capital 
investment in excess of $1 billion (or $500 million) to be invested over a period not 
to exceed three years and creates not less than 1,000 full time jobs with wages equal 
to or greater than 150 percent of Tennessee’s average industrial wage, the enterprise 
shall be allowed $5,000 for each net job.  In addition to the credits allowed for the 
first tax year, a portion of the credits may also apply on an annual basis to offset 
taxpayer’s franchise tax and excise tax liability for each subsequent year up to a total 
of 20 years.  The Commissioner of Economic and Community Development with 
written concurrence of the Comptroller must determine that the location and nature of 
the investment is economically desirable and in the best interests of the citizens.  
Effective July 1, 2000.  (TCA 67-4-2109(c)(2) (G) and (H).) 
An Analysis of a Proposed New Economic 
Development Incentive 
 
 
45  
Business tax credits for personal property taxes: If there is an agreement 
between the property owner and a local governmental unit when property is 
transferred to a governmental unit, credits are prohibited if the city or county 
government has rejected the credit by a 2/3 vote.  Prior law provided that such 
provision must be “approved” by 2/3 vote.  Effective May 22, 2001 and retroactively 
applicable to tax years beginning January 1, 1999 for agreements in effect on that 
date. (TCA Section 67-4-713(a)(6)(C).) 
 
G.  Virginia 
Credit for machinery purchase of equipment used for processing 
recyclable materials was extended from January 1, 2001 to January 1, 2004.  This 
credit allows individuals and corporations an income tax credit equal to 10 percent of 
the purchase price paid for machinery and equipment, as certified by the Department 
of Environmental Quality, used to process recycled materials for sale.  The total 
credit allowed cannot exceed 40 percent of the taxpayer’s Virginia income tax 
liability in the year of purchase. Effective July 1, 2001. (Code Section 58.1-439.7.) 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits were modified to reduce the maximum 
amount authorized annually from $3.5 million to $500,000.  Taxpayers may now take 
the credit against the bank franchise tax and the gross receipts tax on insurance 
premiums.  The tax credit applies to any five taxable years in which a federal low-
income housing tax credit is allowed instead of the first five taxable years in the 
federal credit is allowed.  Any unused credit may be carried over for five taxable 
years or until the full credit is used, whichever occurs first.  Effective for taxable 
years beginning January 1, 2001. (Code section 36-55.63 and 58.10435.) 
Information Technology or Biotechnology Capital Credit: The 
Technology Initiative in Tobacco-Dependent Localities Fund will be used to fund tax 
credits and/or grants for capital, debt, cash, and stock investments in technology 
companies located in tobacco-dependent communities and for qualified research 
taking place in these communities.  Credits for capital investments are limited to 5 
percent of the amount of the investment up to $500,000 in aggregate per taxpayer.  
Tax credits for qualified research taking place in the specified localities is limited to 
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50 percent of the amount paid or incurred for such research and may be taken in the 
year in which such R&D activity occurred.  Effective January 2000 and expiring 
January 2010.  (H.B. 402, 2000 Session Code Section 58-1-439.12.) 
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Appendix 
Descriptions of Kentucky’s Incentive Programs 
 
KENTUCKY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ACT (KIDA) 
Eligible Companies  
 
 Any business entity that establishes new manufacturing plants or expands 
existing manufacturing operations in Kentucky.  
 
Eligible Projects  
 
 The project must involve a minimum investment of $100,000 and create at 
least 15 new full-time jobs for persons subject to Kentucky income tax. Land, 
building fixtures, and equipment for new and expanding manufacturing companies, 
together with storage, warehousing, and related office facilities. Eligible costs include 
expenditures for land acquisition, site development, utility extensions, architectural 
and engineering services, building, construction or rehabilitation, purchases of 
building fixtures including installation costs, and manufacturing equipment. The 
project's real estate must be acquired by the approved company through either the 
transfer of title to the company or through a capital lease as defined under FASB 13. 
Eligible manufacturing equipment cost is limited to $10,000 tax credit for every full-
time job created.  
 
Tax Credits  
 
 A KIDA approved company chooses to receive either a 100 percent credit 
against the Kentucky income tax liability generated by the project or to utilize a 3 
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percent Job Development Assessment Fee (JDAF). This entails a withholding from 
the employees hired as a result of the KIDA approved project for 3 percent of the 
employees gross wages. The employees recoup the JDAF through a state income tax 
credit equal to the amount withheld. Either option is limited to the annual amount of 
debt service (principal and interest) paid to a lender in connection with the eligible 
financing.  However, the maximum KIDA incentive (the tax credit or job 
development assessment fee) cannot exceed the original principal amount of debt 
used as the basis for the transaction. The tax credit or JDAF remains in place for the 
term of the financing or 10 years, whichever occurs first. Unused credits may be 
carried forward for the term of the KIDA agreement.  
 
Financing  
 
 Since the benefits under the KIDA program are related to debt service 
payments, the company must incur debt for the project's fixed asset financing. The 
debt financing may be provided through any source such as bank loans, industrial 
revenue  bonds,  inter-company  loans  or   shareholder   loans.    The   debt   must  be 
structured as a term loan to be included in the KIDA Financing Agreement for 
recovery through the tax incentives.  
 
The Process  
 
1. The company makes application to KEDFA 
2. KEDFA approves the applicant as a preliminarily approved company, 
approves the project, and enters into a memorandum of agreement with the company.  
3. The company provides KEDFA with the debt instruments to be used for the 
project financing.  
4. A KIDA Financing Agreement is drafted by KEDFA based on the debt 
instruments.  
5. The final KIDA Financing Agreement is approved by KEDFA.  
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Fees  
 
 There is a $500 non-refundable application fee payable upon submission of 
the KIDA application. Fees which the company may expect to incur as a result of 
final approval include an administrative fee equal to 1/4 of 1 percent ($40,000 
maximum) of the principal amount of debt used as the basis for the transaction. In 
addition, the company will incur legal fees necessary for the preparation of the 
Financing Agreement.  
 
KENTUCKY RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACT 
(KREDA) 
Eligible Companies  
 
 Any business entity that establishes new manufacturing plants or expands 
existing manufacturing operations in qualifying Kentucky counties.  
Qualified Counties  
 
 Kentucky counties whose average annual unemployment rate has exceeded 
the state average annual unemployment rate in the five preceding calendar years or 
counties whose unemployment rate is 200 percent of the statewide unemployment 
rate for the preceding year are eligible. Once a company is operating under a KREDA 
agreement, the company maintains its KREDA benefits regardless of the county's 
KREDA status.  
 
Eligible Projects  
 
 All fixed assets of the project that are financed via a term loan are eligible for 
recovery through the KREDA tax incentives. The project's real estate must be 
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acquired by the approved company through either the acquisition of title or through a 
capital lease as defined under FASB 13. The project must also create and maintain a 
minimum of 15 new jobs for persons subject to Kentucky income tax and the 
project's total capital investment must exceed $100,000.  
 
Tax Credits  
 
 A KREDA approved company receives a 100 percent credit against the 
Kentucky income tax liability on taxable income generated by the project limited to 
the annual amount of debt service (principal and interest) paid to a lender in 
connection with the eligible project financing. However, the maximum KREDA 
incentives (the tax credit and job development assessment fee) cannot exceed the 
original principal amount of debt used as the basis for the transaction. The tax credit 
remains in place for the term of the financing or 15 years, whichever occurs first. 
Unused credits used may be carried forward through the term of the KEDA 
agreement.  
 
Job Development Assessment Fees  
 
 An approved company may also utilize the Job Development Assessment Fee 
(" JDAF") in connection with the KREDA project. This entails a withholding equal to 
4 percent of the gross wages from the employees hired as a result of the KREDA 
approved project. The employees recoup the JDAF through a state income tax credit 
equal to the amount of JDAF withheld. As a convenience, the JDAF is offset against 
normal state income tax for each pay period and the employee receives credit on the 
W-2 statement as if the JDAF was withheld and remitted to the state.  
Financing  
 
 Since the benefits under the KREDA program are related to debt service 
payments, the company must incur debt for the project's fixed asset financing. The 
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financing may be provided through any source such as bank loans, industrial revenue 
bonds, inter-company loans or shareholder loans. The debt must be structured as a 
term loan to be included in the KREDA Financing Agreement for recovery through 
the tax incentives.  
The Process  
 
1. The company makes application to KEDFA.  
2. KEDFA approves the applicant as a preliminarily approved company, 
preliminarily approves the project and enters into a memorandum of 
agreement with the company.  
3. The company provides KEDFA with the debt instrument(s)to be used for the 
project fixed asset financing.  
4. A Financing Agreement is drafted by KEDFA based on the debt instruments.  
5. The final Financing Agreement is approved by KEDFA.  
 
Fees  
 
 There is a $500 non-refundable application fee payable upon submission of 
the KREDA application. Fees which the company may expect to incur as a result of 
final approval include an administrative fee equal to l/4 of 1 percent ($40,000 
maximum) of the principal amount of debt used as the basis for the transaction. In 
addition, the company will incur legal fees necessary for the preparation of the 
Financing Agreement.  
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KENTUCKY JOBS DEVELOPMENT ACT (KJDA) 
 
 
Eligible Companies  
 
Eligible companies that may receive KJDA benefits are service or technology related 
companies such as data processing, research and development, and other non-
manufacturing, non-retail "white collar" companies. These companies must provide 
more than 75 percent of their services, as generated through revenues, to persons 
located outside the state. Additionally, the company must increase its employment of 
Kentucky residents by a minimum of 25 new, full-time jobs at the project.  
 
Approved Costs  
 
Approved costs are defined as 50 percent of the start-up costs which include the costs 
associated with furnishing and equipping the facility and 50 percent of the annual rent 
costs. Maximum approved start-up costs are $10,000 per new full time job for 
Kentucky residents subject to personal income tax.  
 
Inducements  
 
The company receives a 100 percent credit against the state income tax arising from 
the project, and a wage assessment of up to 5 percent of the increased gross payroll of 
the new employment resulting from the project. Total assessments and credits cannot 
exceed the approved costs, and cannot be taken beyond a 10-year period.  
 
Employee Tax Credit  
 
If the company uses the wage assessment portion of the program, each employee is 
An Analysis of a Proposed New Economic 
Development Incentive 
 
 
54  
entitled to an income tax credit against their Kentucky income tax equal to 4/5 of the 
total wage assessment. In addition, the employee is entitled to credit against local 
occupational tax equal to l/5 of the total wage assessment.  
 
Fees  
 
There is a $500 non-refundable application fee payable upon submission of the 
KJDA application. Fees which the company may expect to incur as a result of final 
approval include an administrative fee equal to l/10 of 1 percent with a minimum of 
$1,000. In addition, the company will incur legal fees necessary for the preparation of 
the Agreement.  
 
Process 
 
1. A completed application is submitted by the company to KEDFA and local 
jurisdiction before the last Friday of the month prior to the KEDFA Board 
meeting. 
2. A letter from the company describing the project and outlining the company's 
compliance with the criteria for the program is submitted with the application. 
3. A letter from the local jurisdiction supporting the project is submitted with 
the application.  
4. A Preliminary Resolution is executed by KEDFA approving the project 
which occurs at the board meeting held approximately 30 days after 
submission of the application.  
5. At the time of Preliminary approval, a Memorandum of Agreement is sent to 
the company to be executed.  
6. A public hearing is held approximately 3-6 months prior to Final approval.  
7. A resolution is adopted by the local jurisdiction prior to Final approval.  
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8. Final approval and execution of the Service and Technology Agreement will 
occur within 1 year from the date of Preliminary approval. The Agreement 
must be fully negotiated at the time of Final approval. All fees must be paid 
and the Activation date of the project must be set in order to finalize the 
Agreement. Activation of the project can occur no later than one year from 
Final approval. Verification of the start-up costs and rental payments will 
occur after Activation.  
9. After Activation, exhibits included within the Agreement will be submitted 
every year for the duration of the company's participation within the program 
for up to ten years.  
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